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Abstract. Ding et al [DNRS97] propose a stream generator based on
several layers. We present several attacks. First, we observe that the
non-surjectivity of a linear combination step allows us to recover half
the key with minimal eort. Next, we show that the various bytes are
insuciently mixed by these layers, enabling an attack similar to those on
two-loop Vigenere ciphers to recover the remainder of the key. Combining
these techniques lets us recover the entire TWOPRIME key. We require
the generator to produce 2
33 blocks (2
35 bytes), or 19 hours worth of
output, of which we examine about one million blocks (2
23 bytes); the
computational workload can be estimated at 2
28 operations. Another
set of attacks trades o texts for time, reducing the amount of known
plaintext needed to just eight blocks (64 bytes), while needing 2
32 time
and 2
32 space. We also show how to break two variants of TWOPRIME
presented in the original paper.
1 Introduction
The TWOPRIME stream cipher [DNRS97], introduced at FSE'97, uses a 128-
bit key to generate 64-bit blocks of output at each time step; these output
blocks are exclusive-ORed onto the plaintext to produce ciphertext. At a high
level, TWOPRIME consists of a keyed (non-bijective) cryptographic function
with 64-bit inputs and 64-bit outputs, which is used in a counter-like mode to
generate keystream output.
The algorithm has ten layers; the rst layer is driven by a counter, and the
output of each layer becomes the input to the next. We exploit weaknesses of
two of the layers to produce several dierent attacks against the scheme. Our
conclusion is that there are too few layers for cryptographic strength.
One of the main contributions of the TWOPRIME work is that the algorithm
was designed so that one could prove certain statements about the security of the
cipher: it has high linear complexity, good cycle length, good resistance to LSFR-
synthesis attacks, and so on1. Nonetheless, despite the proofs of various security
properties, in this paper we show how to break TWOPRIME very eciently.
1 Note that it is possible to prove that using any block cipher in counter mode has good
linear complexity and good cycle length|at least, in the sense that [DNRS97] proved
for TWOPRIME|so in retrospect these proofs are perhaps not terribly meaningful.Our attacks fall into two natural categories. The rst three attacks, discussed
in Sections 4{7, recover half of the key (namely, K2;K3). The second category
(see Sections 8{9) includes two techniques which identify the remainder of the
key (K0;K1) once we've found K2;K3.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the
TWOPRIME scheme. In Section 3 we give some preliminary remarks which will
be useful in the cryptanalysis. Section 4 gives a very easy attack to recover half
of the key, based on the linear map of layer 7 failing to be surjective. Section 5
shows another attack that reduces the plaintext requirements; the cost for this
improvement is an increase in the amount of oine computation required. Sec-
tion 6 gives a more complicated attack to recover K2;K3 by breaking the period
of p0p1 into two periods of p0 and p1 respectively. The probabilistic analysis
backing up this attack is mentioned in Section 7. In Section 8 and 9 we nish
with two attacks which can be used to recover the remainder of the key in a more
mundane manner. Section 10 discusses some of the computational requirements
of each attack. Section 11 and 12 discuss variants of the original scheme, and
some attacks on these variants. Conclusions are reserved for Section 14.
2 Description of TWOPRIME
The TWOPRIME scheme [DNRS97] uses a 128-bit key to generate 64-bit blocks
of output at each time step; these output blocks are exclusive-ORed onto the
plaintext to produce ciphertext. At a high level, TWOPRIME consists of a keyed
function FK : Z
8
256 ! Z
8
256 and a custom mode for using F to generate keystream
output.
The mode is somewhat similar to counter mode: the input to F comes from
two independent 32-bit counters. Each counter is initialized with a key-dependent
value, and is stepped by adding a public constant and then reducing modulo a
public 32-bit prime.
The key, consisting of 16 bytes k0;:::;k15, is divided into four 32-bit parts,
named K0;K1;K2 and K3, with the convention
K0 = k8 + k928 + k10216 + k11224
K1 = k12 + k1328 + k14216 + k15224
K2 = (k0;k1;k2;k3)
K3 = (k4;k5;k6;k7):
The algorithm has ten layers, which we will describe. The output of each layer
becomes the input of the subsequent layer. With one exception, each output
consists of eight bytes, and so is an element of Z
8
256. The scheme is depicted
graphically in Figure 1.
The rst layer involves two primes, p0 = 232   17 and p1 = 232   5, and two
xed public integers a0 and a1. At time step t, the output of the rst layer is
the two 32-bit integers r0 = a0t+K0 (mod p0) and r1 = a1t+K1 (mod p1).
Each is broken into four 8-bit bytes, yielding a total of eight bytes output.bytewise exor
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Fig.1. Structure of the ciphering algorithm.
In the second layer, each byte x is replaced by S0(x) = [(x255 mod 257) mod
256]. It happens that S0 is its own inverse: S0(S0(x)) = x.
The third layer involves addition (mod 256) of the key bytes constituting K2
and K3.
The fourth layer is a \linear permutation": if x0;:::;x7 are the inputs to thislayer, the outputs are
yj = (
7 X
i=0
xi)   xj (mod 256):
This is intended to mix the bytes; however, as we shall see, it is too weak. The
only interaction between the various bytes xi is through the single byte
P
i xi
(mod 256), and when that byte is controlled, the mixing is ineective.
The fth layer involves addition (mod 256) of the key bytes constituting K0
and K1.
The sixth layer is a non-linear expansion: each byte x is expanded to the
concatenation of four bytes S1(x);S2(x);S3(x);S4(x), where the Si are various
nonlinear permutations on Z256. The output of this layer is 32 bytes.
The seventh layer applies a linear compression to reduce these 32 bytes back
to 8 bytes; that is, a xed public 8  32 matrix fbijg maps Z
32
256 to Z
8
256. Upon
input (X0;:::;X31), the linear transform b produces the output (Y0;:::;Y7) =
b(X0;:::;X31) according to the equation
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
Y0 = X0 + X5 + X10 + X15 + X16 + X22 + X24 + X30;
Y1 = X1 + X6 + X11 + X12 + X17 + X23 + X25 + X31;
Y2 = X2 + X7 + X8 + X13 + X18 + X20 + X26 + X28;
Y3 = X3 + X4 + X9 + X14 + X19 + X21 + X27 + X29;
Y4 = X16 + X21 + X26 + X31 + X0 + X6 + X8 + X14;
Y5 = X17 + X22 + X27 + X28 + X5 + X11 + X13 + X3;
Y6 = X18 + X23 + X24 + X29 + X10 + X12 + X2 + X4;
Y7 = X19 + X20 + X25 + X30 + X15 + X1 + X7 + X9:
(1)
The eighth layer applies the permutation S0 to each byte.
In the ninth layer, bytes from K2 and K3 are exclusive-ORed into the bytes.
The tenth round consists of exclusive-ORing these bytes (the output of the
ninth round) onto the plaintext to produce the ciphertext, or (in the case of
decryption) onto the ciphertext to recover plaintext.
Let us denote by x
(j)
i (0  i  7;1  j  10) the ith byte of the output
of the jth round. (For j = 6 we will allow 0  i  31.) If the time step t is
important we will write x
(j;t)
i . The notation x
(j)
 will mean the whole 8-tuple of
bytes [x
(j)
i ;0  i  7].
3 Remarks on the scheme
During most of the rounds, the various bytes remain separate. During the rst
round, four bytes are output from one 32-bit word, and four from another. The
fourth round combines bytes with a linear map, but (as has been remarked) this
does a weak job of mixing them.
The seventh round combines pieces of the various bytes much more thor-
oughly, but only with a linear transformation. Also, the seventh round lies close
to the surface, which lets us exploit the lack of diusion in the rest of the cipher.The designers explain that the internal structure of TWOPRIME (i.e. the
function F) was chosen to resist inversion attacks (where one tries to use the
output of F to work backwards). Two of our attacks succeed exactly because we
can work backwards from the output of F.
In fact, we use the non-invertibility of F to our advantage in Sections 4{5.
Because F is not bijective, not all intermediate values are possible. In particular,
the combination of the sixth and seventh layers forms a non-surjective function,
so not all 64-bit values are attainable as the output of the seventh layer. Fur-
thermore, layers 8{10 depend only on K2;K3, and not on K0;K1. Therefore, we
can isolate the eect of K2;K3 and attack them standing alone. Later, we can
peel o layers 8{10 and use separate techniques (see Sections 8{9) to recover the
remainder of the key (K0;K1).
4 Linear algebra
The linear recombination step (layer seven) suers from the following regularity.
Denote by  the 8-vector [1;1;1;1; 1; 1; 1; 1]. The matrix bij obeys P
i ibij = 0 (mod 256) for all indices j. This implies that
7 X
i=0
ix
(7)
i = 0 (mod 256): (2)
We can use this information, and a few known outputs of the stream generator,
to recover the half of the key (K2;K3).
For each byte position i we have
x
(7)
i = S0(x
(8)
i ) = S0(x
(9)
i  ki);
recalling that S0 is its own inverse. For each i this gives a xed mapping from
x
(9)
i to x
(7)
i , independent of time and of the other bytes.
Denote by yij the unknown quantity
yij = S0(j  ki)
which would be the value of x
(7)
i if x
(9)
i = j. For each block of output of the
stream cipher (at time t) we obtain a linear equation relating these quantities:
0 =
7 X
i=0
ix
(7;t)
i =
7 X
i=0
iyi;x
(9;t)
i
(mod 256):
After we obtain about 2,048 blocks (16;384 bytes) of output, we will have 2,048
linear equations in the 2,048 unknowns yij, 0  i  7;0  j  255. Because
of homogeneity these equations will not be independent, and for xed i we will
recover yij only up to an unknown multiplicative factor and an unknown additive
shift:
yij = izij + i (mod 256) (3)with zij known but i;i unknown.
But this is clearly enough information to recover the unknown key byte ki,
using a few hundred operations of trial-and-error. For each possible value for ki,
decrypt three or four values j = x
(9)
i into yij = S0(j ki) and check against (3).
The correct ki will be compatible with (3), and only a few others; a few more
trial decryptions should rule out the false alarms.
Having determined (k0;:::;k7) = (K2;K3), we still2 have to nd K0 and K1.
This seems to be more expensive (and less interesting). We see a way of nding
them using about 232 operations and just a few known outputs of the stream
cipher. See Sections 8{9.
The present attack does require about 2048 blocks (16384 bytes) of stream
output. Those known plaintext requirements are not onerous, but it is possible to
reduce them even further with meet-in-the-middle techniques, which we discuss
next.
5 A meet-in-the-middle attack
In this attack, we take advantage of the non-surjectivity of layer seven in a
dierent way. It is essentially a meet-in-the-middle attack, taking advantage of
unattainable values at the output of the seventh layer.
Roughly speaking, we guess (K2;K3) and work backwards from a block of
known keystream to nd the output of the seventh layer, using unattainable
values to rule out incorrect guesses at (K2;K3). This would take 264 time to
implement as stated; however, we have an optimization (again based on meet-
in-the-middle techniques) to reduce the complexity to 232.
As before, we rely on the crucial observation (2). If we take some keystream
block x
(9)
 , then inverting layers 8{9 shows that x
(7)
i = S0(x
(9)
i  ki): Plugging
into (2) gives us a relation that the correct value of the key k0;:::;k7 must
satisfy.
So the attack proceeds as follows. We dene
g(K2;y0;:::;y3) =
3 X
i=0
S0(yi  ki) (mod 256)
h(K3;y4;:::;y7) =
7 X
i=4
S0(yi  ki) (mod 256):
We obtain eight known keystream blocks x
(9;j)
 ;0  j  7, and let
g0(K2) = (g(K2;x
(9;0)
0 ;:::;x
(9;0)
3 );:::;g(K2;x
(9;7)
0 ;:::;x
(9;7)
3 ))
h0(K3) = (g(K3;x
(9;0)
4 ;:::;x
(9;0)
7 );:::;g(K3;x
(9;7)
4 ;:::;x
(9;7)
7 )):
2 In some situations, recovering just (K2;K3) might conceivably suce. After all, this
gives us enough information to predict some keystream bytes: given any seven bytes
from a keystream block, we can predict the eighth unknown byte with certainty by
using (2). However, we can do much better. As we shall see, recovering (K0;K1) in
a second phase requires a bit more work, but it is still feasible.Note that, for the correct value of (K2;K3), we have g0(K2) = h0(K3).
After all this eort to frame things in the language of meet-in-the-middle
attacks, it should be clear how to recover (K2;K3) with standard techniques.
(Here the \middle" for the meet-in-the-middle attack will be the 64-bit value
g0(K2) = h0(K3), i.e. a characteristic of the output of the seventh layer.)
First, for each guess at K2, we compute g0(K2), and store the pair (g0(K2);K2)
in a hash table indexed on the rst coordinate of the pair. After enumerating all
232 possibilities for K2, we will have constructed a hash table of size 232. Then,
for each guess at K3, we compute h0(K3) and look it up in the hash table. If we
nd a match g0(K2) = h0(K3), then with high probability we will have obtained
the correct values for (K2;K3).
We need eight keystream blocks to ensure that the test will eliminate nearly
all incorrect values. One can count the number of false alarms by counting the
number of solutions a;b to g0(a) = h0(b). Because S0 is highly non-linear, we are
justied in expecting the functions g0;h0 to behave roughly like random functions
of the form Z
4
256 ! Z
8
256. Combining this heuristic with the birthday paradox,
we nd that the probability of generating a false alarm is 1   e 1  0:63, and
the expected number of false alarms is 1.
To aid the intuition, we can think of the present attack as applying a meet-
in-the-middle attack twice, splitting the cipher rst with a horizontal cut and
then splitting it again with a vertical cut.
The horizontal cut is possible because layer seven fails to be surjective, and it
is benecial because layers 8{10 only depend on half of the key. (There is a slight
dierence, though. In a normal meet-in-the-middle attack, one computes forward
part-way, backward part-way, and then meets in the middle. In our attack on
TWOPRIME, because layers 6{7 fail to be surjective, we only need to compute
backwards, and the forward part of the computation is substantially simplied.)
The vertical cut is made possible by the linearity of layer seven (or, more
precisely, the linearity of (2)). Here the \middle" is the value g0(K2) = h0(K3).
We compute up the left half, and up the right half, and then meet in the \middle"
of the output of the seventh layer. This second application of meet-in-the-middle
techniques lets us isolate the eect of K2 from that of K3, and hence reduces
the attacker's workload signicantly.
In summary, we can recover (K2;K3) with 232 oine work, 232 space, and
about eight blocks (64 bytes) of known keystream. As we shall see in Section 10,
the computational requirements are not unreasonable.
6 Splitting the period
The previous two attacks could be avoided (in a hypothetical TWOPRIME
successor) by using a dierent linear transformation at layer seven. So we develop
here another attack against that eventuality.
This attack is similar to the attacks on two-loop Vigenere ciphers, which can
be found in references [Sin68] and [Tuc70].For an arbitrary time step t0, let us consider the outputs at four specic time
steps:
a = t0
b = t0 + p0
c = t0 + p1
d = t0 + p0 + p1:
Because the counters at layer 1 are cyclic with periods p0 and p1 respectively,
we have
x
(1;a)
i = x
(1;b)
i ; x
(1;c)
i = x
(1;d)
i ; 0  i  3
x
(1;a)
i = x
(1;c)
i ; x
(1;b)
i = x
(1;d)
i ; 4  i  7;
and hence, because the actions of subsequent layers are time-invariant,
x
(3;a)
i = x
(3;b)
i ; x
(3;c)
i = x
(3;d)
i ; 0  i  3
x
(3;a)
i = x
(3;c)
i ; x
(3;b)
i = x
(3;d)
i ; 4  i  7:
Consider the event E that the following two equations both hold:
3 X
i=0
x
(3;a)
i =
3 X
i=0
x
(3;c)
i (mod 256)
7 X
i=4
x
(3;a)
i =
7 X
i=4
x
(3;b)
i (mod 256):
Each equation holds with probability about 1=256 (for randomly chosen time
step t0), and the two are independent, so that event E holds with probability
about 1=65536. When it does hold, we have
7 X
i=0
x
(3;a)
i =
7 X
i=0
x
(3;b)
i =
7 X
i=0
x
(3;c)
i =
7 X
i=0
x
(3;d)
i (mod 256):
This in turn implies that the outputs of layer 4 are well behaved:
x
(4;a)
i = x
(4;b)
i ; x
(4;c)
i = x
(4;d)
i ; 0  i  3
x
(4;a)
i = x
(4;c)
i ; x
(4;b)
i = x
(4;d)
i ; 4  i  7:
This can be pushed forward to give information on the outputs of layer 6:
x
(6;a)
i = x
(6;b)
i ; x
(6;c)
i = x
(6;d)
i ; 0  i  15
x
(6;a)
i = x
(6;c)
i ; x
(6;b)
i = x
(6;d)
i ; 16  i  31
x
(6;a)
i + x
(6;d)
i = x
(6;b)
i + x
(6;c)
i ; 0  i  31;
and because layer 7 is linear (mod 256), we get
x
(7;a)
i + x
(7;d)
i = x
(7;b)
i + x
(7;c)
i (mod 256): (4)Suppose we know that event E has occurred for time step t0, and that we
have available for the output of the stream cipher x
(9;h)
i . Then from x
(7;h)
i =
S0(ki  x
(9;h)
i ) and (4), we get a suitability test for possible values of key byte
ki. That is, for each position 0  i  7, for each possible value of ki, we test
whether the values of x
(7;h)
i obtained from x
(9;h)
i using ki would satisfy (4):
S0(kix
(9;a)
i )+S0(kix
(9;d)
i )
? = S0(kix
(9;b)
i )+S0(kix
(9;c)
i ) (mod 256): (5)
Each concatenation of possible bytes (k0;k1;:::;k7) from this step represents
a possible setting of (K2;K3) consistent with the event E having occurred at
this time step t0. We will call this 8-byte setting a putative key.
If event E did occur, then the correct setting of (k0;k1;:::;k7) will be rep-
resented among these possibilities. If it did not occur, we may get several false
alarms.
The diculty is that we do not know, a priori, whether event E occurred or
not. We may nd that for one of the byte positions i there is no possible setting
of ki satisfying (5); in this case we know that E did not occur at t0 and this case
can be discarded.
Our strategy will be to try about 330,000 dierent values of t0, and for each
one that has at least one possible setting for each of the eight bytes ki, record
the possible values of the 8-tuple (k0;k1;:::;k7) = (K2;K3). The correct value
should show up about ve times among these putative keys, and incorrect values
should show up less often. Having ascertained the correct value for (K2;K3), we
will be able to get the keys (K0;K1) with less diculty in Section 8.
7 Probabilistic analysis
For our analysis it will be useful to know the following two probability distribu-
tions.
For bytes xa;xb;xc;xd, representing x
(9;a)
i ;:::;x
(9;d)
i , let N(xa;xb;xc;xd) be
the number of key bytes k that would satisfy (5):
S0(ki  xa) + S0(ki  xd)
? = S0(ki  xb) + S0(ki  xc) (mod 256): (6)
We want to know the distribution P1(n) = Pr(N(xa;xb;xc;xd) = n) when the
xh are independent random variables. We also want to know the distribution
P2(n) = Pr(N(xa;xb;xc;xd) = n) when the xh are known to arise from event E,
that is, when the correct key byte ki is known to satisfy (6). The two are related
by P2(n) = nP1(n). The experimental distributions are given in the Appendix.
The rst distribution is almost Poisson with mean 1: P1(n) = e 1=n!, with
three notable exceptions.
First, P1(256)  2=2562 = 2 15, because with that probability we either have
(xa = xb and xc = xd), or (xa = xc and xb = xd), and in either case all key
bytes k will work.Second, P1(128)  (1=2)=2562 = 2 17, and similarly P1(64)  (5=4)=2562,
P1(32)  (13=8)=2562, and P1(16);P1(8) are similarly high. This happens be-
cause of idiosyncrasies of the permutation S0. For example, in the case n = 128,
consider the event that xa  xd = xb  xc = 11111101 in binary, and xa and xb
agree in the second-lowest bit. This event has probability (1=256)2(1=2) = 2 17.
When this happens, for all 128 key bytes k disagreeing with xa in the second-
lowest bit, we have (k  xa) + (k  xd) = 257. Then, because S0(x) = x 1
(mod 257) if x 6= 0, we have
S0(k  xa) + S0(k  xd) = S0(k  xb) + S0(k  xc) = 257
for each of these 128 values of k, so that N(xa;xb;xc;xd)  128. This implies
P1(128)  2 17. Similar calculations obtain for n = 64;32;16;8.
Third, it appears experimentally that P1(0) is a little higher than expected:
0.40 rather than 0.37; and P1(1) is a little lower. This may be related to the rst
two observations.
These deviations from the Poisson distribution, particularly the relative high
values of P2(256) and P2(128), create a minor nuisance for our cryptanalysis.
When event E has happened, the distribution P2(n) is related to the number
of trial key bytes ki that would satisfy (6) in each byte position i. The number
of 8-byte keys (k0;k1;:::;k7) is given by
7 Y
i=0
N(x
(9;a)
i ;x
(9;b)
i ;x
(9;c)
i ;x
(9;d)
i )
with expected value about 4:38  120;000. This expected value is so high because
of the unusually large values of P2(256) and P2(128).
When event E has not happened, the distribution P1(n) is relevant, and the
expected number of 8-byte keys is 1. In fact with probability about 1   (1  
0:404)8  0:984 at least one of the values N(x
(9;a)
i ;x
(9;b)
i ;x
(9;c)
i ;x
(9;d)
i ) is zero, so
that no 8-byte keys are valid; with the complementary probability 0:016, all are
nonzero, and then the expected number of keys is 1=0:016  62.
So with 330,000 experiments, the expected number of 8-byte putative keys is
5120;000+(330;000 5)1 = 930;000. Among these, the correct key should
appear ve times, and should be easy to detect; incorrect keys should appear
at most once, with possible exception of those diering from the correct key in
only one or two bytes.
Remark: Although the mean number of putative keys is fairly small, the
variance is huge; the standard deviation exceeds 1011. This is because of the rela-
tively high probability that, for a given time step and byte position, N(xa;xb;xc;xd)
is either 256 or 128; if several such bytes occur at the same time step, this time
step will yield a huge number of putative keys. In this case an alternative data
structure is called for. For example, if one time step has two or more such byte
positions, declare that event E has probably occurred, and deduce putative val-
ues for the remaining six or fewer key bytes. Or we could simply list 4-byte
putative keys K2 and K3 separately.8 Splitting the period, again
Having determined K2 and K3 by the attack in Section 6, we also know the
handful of positions where event E has occurred; we know several places where
3 X
i=0
x
(3;a)
i =
3 X
i=0
x
(3;c)
i (mod 256):
Because of the relation between x
(3)
i and x
(2)
i we also have
3 X
i=0
x
(2;a)
i =
3 X
i=0
x
(2;c)
i (mod 256);
whence
3 X
i=0
S0(x
(1;a)
i ) =
3 X
i=0
S0(x
(1;c)
i ) (mod 256): (7)
By enumeration of 232 possibilities, we can nd all the possible values of the con-
catenation (x
(1;a)
0 ;x
(1;a)
1 ;x
(1;a)
2 ;x
(1;a)
3 ) and hence, by adding p1a0 (mod p0), the
concatenation (x
(1;c)
0 ;x
(1;c)
1 ;x
(1;c)
2 ;x
(1;c)
3 ), which satisfy (7). This whittles down
the possible values of K0 from a collection of 232 to about 232=2565 = 212 pos-
sible values. Similar calculations reduce our choice of K1 to about 212 possible
values. The correct values can be gotten by exhaustion.
9 Meet-in-the-middle, again
Another approach at recovering (K0;K1) is given here. We assume that we have
previously identied (K2;K3) using any of the attacks from Sections 4{6. This
attack requires only 232 operations, 224 space, and two known keystream blocks;
therefore, it should be very fast.
Because of the form of the linear relation in layer 7, we nd that the sum x
(7)
0 +
x
(7)
2   x
(7)
4   x
(7)
6 (mod 256) depends only on the four bytes x
(5)
i ;i = 1;3;5;7.
Use a meet-in-the-middle approach, requiring time 2563 = 224, to discover all
the 224 values of the 4-tuple [x
(5)
i ;i = 1;3;5;7] that could lead to a given value
for this sum. Similarly the sum x
(7)
0 + x
(7)
2   x
(7)
5   x
(7)
7 (mod 256) depends
only on the four bytes x
(5)
i ;i = 0;2;4;6. Combine these two lists with another
meet-in-the-middle attack, and in time 224 we can recover the 8-tuple x
(5)
 from
any given value of the 8-tuple x
(7)
 .
Use time 224 to decrypt one ciphertext back to layer 5. For each of the 232
trial subkeys K0, compute forward to x
(3)
i ;0  i  3, and backward from layer 5
to x
(4)
i ;0  i  3. See whether there is a byte sum
P7
i=0 x
(3)
i which would enable
the linear permutation at layer 4 to map x
(3)
i ;0  i  3 to x
(4)
i ;0  i  3. We
expect 256 trial subkeys K0 to pass this test. Similarly develop 256 trial subkeys
K1. Try each of the resulting 65,536 pairs (K0;K1) on another ciphertext to
determine the correct pair.10 Computational requirements
The rst attack should take only a few seconds to nd all of K2 and K3, including
gathering data.
The meet-in-the-middle attack recovering (K2;K3) (see Section 5) requires
232 hash table lookups and about 233 words of memory. If we keep the entire
table in memory, the 232 table lookups will take only 400 seconds or so (assuming
100ns access time to main memory, which is not unreasonable).
The space requirements may be more noticeable. One simple approach is
to distribute the table across a cluster of 256 workstations, each with 128 MB
of memory; such a cluster would take roughly 400 seconds to nd (K2;K3).
Another simple approach, if only one workstation is available, is to trade o
time for memory: by splitting the table across time, one workstation can nish
in 256  400  105 seconds (about one month), and n workstations will nish
n times as fast that. This is not out of reach, and the interested reader might
be able to nd better ways to reduce memory needs: for example, the parallel
collision search techniques of van Oorschot and Wiener [OW96] (applied to nd
a \golden collision") look promising.
For the attack based on identifying occurrences of event E (see Sections 6{8),
we need the generator to run for p0 +p1  233 time steps, generating 236 bytes.
At the advertised speed of 1 megabyte per second, this will take about nineteen
hours. We will look at only 1,000,000 message blocks (8,000,000 bytes): 330,000
at the beginning (representing a), another 330,000 in the middle (representing
both b and c, because p0 and p1 are so close to each other), and another 330,000
at the end. For each selection (a;b;c;d) we might need to evaluate 8256 = 2048
trial key bytes 0  ki  255;0  i  7. However, realize that much of the time
we will nd that, for example, key byte k1 has no possible values, so that bytes
k2;:::;k7 need not be examined for this case. In total about 212,000,000 key
bytes need to be examined.
11 TWOPRIME-1
The same paper [DNRS97] proposes a faster version TWOPRIME-1, diering
from TWOPRIME only in the seventh layer; in TWOPRIME-1, this layer pre-
serves halves. That is, the output bytes x
(7)
i ;0  i  3 only depend on the input
bytes x
(6)
i ;0  i  15, and the output bytes x
(7)
i ;4  i  7 only depend on
the input bytes x
(6)
i ;16  i  31. This means that the only interaction between
the left and right halves of the message occurs during the \linear permutation"
in the fourth layer, and there the interaction is limited to the one byte
P
i x
(3)
i
(mod 256). In two time steps where this sum agrees, the halves are completely
separated.
So we can examine the output at time a = t0 and b = t0+p0. If
P7
i=4 x
(3;a)
i =
P7
i=4 x
(3;b)
i (mod 256) (i.e. the second of the two conditions for event E), thenthe left-hand half of the output of each layer is the same for a as for b:
x
(j;a)
i = x
(j;b)
i ; 0  i  3; j 6= 6
x
(6;a)
i = x
(6;b)
i ; 0  i  15:
In particular the left-hand halves of the outputs will agree. By identifying eight
pairs (a;b) where these output halves agree, we can deduce the value of K0 as
in the TWOPRIME case. Similar computations give us K1.
We can then use exhaustive search to compute K2 in about 232 steps. For
example, if we guess the four bytes representing (
P7
j=0 kj)   ki;0  i  3, and
we know the values of K0 and K1, we can nd the left-hand half of all layers up
through layer 8. We can compare the encryptions of two unrelated time steps,
say a and e, to see whether
x
(8;a)
i  x
(8;e)
i
? = x
(9;a)
i  x
(9;e)
i ; 0  i  3:
If not, these four bytes are wrong. But if they are equal, we can use layer 8 to
deduce K2, giving us another check on our original assumptions, and furnishing
us with the correct value of K2. The calculation of K3 is left to the reader.
We needed to run the generator for 232 messages (235 bytes), or ten hours,
and examine about 28256 = 4;096 blocks (32,768 bytes). The computational
requirements of 232 operations are not onerous, and the interested reader might
well nd more ecient methods to discover K2.
Another approach is also available. In the rst phase of this attack, we recover
(K2;K3). The key observation is that|modelling each half of layers 6{7 as a
random function|only about 1   e 1 of the 232 possible values for the left half
of the output of the seventh layer will actually be attainable. Therefore, in the
rst phase, we guess K2, compute up the left side of the cipher to the output
of the seventh layer, and discard guesses at K2 when they produce unattainable
intermediate values. Because (1   e 1)50 < 2 32, we see that after about 50
blocks (400 bytes) of known plaintext, there will be just one value remaining|
namely, the correct value of K2. A similar technique recovers K3.
Now the second phase proceeds as in Section 9. For each guess at K0, we
compute forward down the left side of the cipher to the output of layer 3 and
backward to the output of layer 4, checking to see whether the two are compati-
ble. We expect 256 values of K0 to remain, and similarly 256 values of K1; these
remaining 216 possibilities can be checked by trial encryption.
In short, this second approach breaks TWOPRIME-1 with about the same
time and space complexity as the corresponding attack on TWOPRIME. We re-
quire slightly more known plaintext, but 50 blocks (400 bytes) of known plaintext
should be readily available in many systems.
12 ONEPRIME
The same paper [DNRS97] proposes a scheme ONEPRIME, which diers from
TWOPRIME only in the rst layer: instead of two primes p0 and p1, we haveonly one prime p = 264  59 and xed multiplier a. The output of the rst layer
at time t is
(x
(1)
0 ;:::;x
(1)
7 ) = at + (K0;K1) (mod p):
A slight modication enables our attack to run against this scheme as well. Based
on the value a (which was not specied in the paper), compute values 0 and
1 such that in the binary representation of a0 (mod p), the left-most 34 bits
are 0 (so that the left half is 0 and the right half represents an integer smaller
than 230). Similarly in the binary representation of a1 (mod p), the leftmost
(highest order) two bits are 0, and the rightmost 32 bits are 0. Each i should
be about 234 and can be computed using methods from continued fractions.
Then if we select time steps
a = t0
b = t0 + 0
c = t0 + 1
d = t0 + 0 + 1
we will nd, with probability exceeding (3=4)2 > 0:56, that the left-hand halves
of the outputs of layer 1 agree at times a and b, as well as at times c and d; and
the right-hand halves agree at times a and c, as well as at times b and d. The
rest of the attack proceeds as before.
We need the generator to run for somewhat longer, because 0 > p0, and
we need to examine someone more ciphertext, because our favorable conditions
only occur with probability 0:56, but the attack is still feasible.
Another approach is also available. We can break ONEPRIME with meet-in-
the-middle techniques. In fact, simply applying the attacks in Sections 5 and 9
immediately breaks ONEPRIME, without any modications needed. This second
approach requires eight blocks of known keystream as well as 233 time and 232
space.
13 Discussion
At a high level, the intuition behind some of our cryptanalysis is that we apply
the meet-in-the-middle attack repeatedly, at two levels of abstraction. First, we
divide the cipher horizontally between layers, and meet at the \middle"|the
output of the seventh layer|at the highest level of abstraction. Second, we
divide the cipher vertically into left and right halves, and meet in the \middle",
where the \middle" is a characteristic of the output of the seventh layer.
Some of the techniques, e.g. Sections 6{8, do not fall cleanly into this model.
We will ignore them for the moment.
Note that the vertical split can be viewed as decomposing the 64-bit function
F into two parallel 32-bit functions G;H. In other words, splitting F vertically
corresponds to writing F(a;b) = (G(a);H(b)). Of course, given such a paralleldecomposition, we can apply a divide-and-conquer attack; since breaking a 32-
bit function has complexity at most 232, such a decomposition lets us break F
in at most 2  232 time.
So we conclude that F should be designed to resist parallel decomposition,
and in particular there should be no parallel G;H that approximate F. This
just comes down to ensuring there is plenty of diusion, a well-known design
principle for cipher design. This lack of diusion helped make our attacks on
TWOPRIME possible.
We can also analyze the horizontal split in terms of functional decomposition.
In this case, we nd that it corresponds to nding G;H such that F = H  G
(i.e. F(a) = H(G(a))). When we can nd such G;H where G is non-surjective
and H is bijective, then meet-in-the-middle attacks may allow the cryptanalyst
to isolate the eect of G from the eect of H. In other words, the cryptanalyst
can often analyze H without taking into account the eect of G (or the key bits
that enter G); once H has been broken, the cryptanalyst can then peel o the
eect of H (since it is bijective) and attack G alone. The result of such a divide-
and-conquer attack would be that F is not much stronger than the strongest of
G or H standing alone. TWOPRIME put some of its strength into G, and some
into H, with the result that much of its strength was wasted. Far better would
have been to concentrate all the strength in one of G or H and make the other
as simple as possible, to avoid this potential danger.
Therefore, we suggest the following design principle, which seems broadly
applicable to the construction of non-bijective cryptographic functions from a
product of rounds. One should avoid introducing non-surjectivity in the middle
of the function, because that may speed up meet-in-the-middle attacks and thus
waste precious cryptographic strength.
Note that the latter design principle oers some intuitive justication for
the structure of many of today's most successful non-bijective cryptographic
functions (such as MD5, SHA, :::). The Davies-Meyer construction [Win84]
builds F as F(a) = G(a)a. Here all the strength is concentrated in a bijective
function G (usually built out of a block cipher); the non-surjectivity is introduced
as late as possible, and as simply as possible. MD2 [Kal92] and Snefru [Mer90]
also follow our suggested design principle: they too use a bijective function G at
the core, and introduce non-surjectivity only at the endpoints (by adding simple
redundancy to the input of G, and truncating its output).
This design principle is not novel. It has been discussed in more detail by
Preneel in the context of the design of compression functions for hash functions;
see [Pre93, e.g. Section 4.2].
14 Conclusions
Pulling it all together, we can identify three important attacks against TWOPRIME.
First, we can break TWOPRIME with 2048 blocks of known keystream and 232
work by using the techniques of Sections 4 and 9. Alternatively, we can get by
with only 8 blocks of known keystream with repeated use of meet-in-the-middleattacks (Sections 5 and 9); the cost is that we need 232 space as well as 233 work.
Finally, we can cryptanalyze TWOPRIME with 233 blocks of known keystream
and about 228 operations by using the methods from Sections 6{8; this last at-
tack uses no special features of the compression function in layer seven (other
than its linearity). We see that, for a cipher with a 128-bit key, TWOPRIME is
disappointingly weak.
We have pointed out weaknesses in two of the layers in TWOPRIME. Because
TWOPRIME has only nine layers, each layer lies close to the surface, and any
weakness is more easily exploited. The system needs more layers to have any
serious cryptographic strength.
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We give here the experimental distributions of P1(n) and P2(n):
n e 1=n! P1(n) P2(n)
0 0:3679 0:404 0
1 0:3679 0:337 0:337
2 0:1839 0:183 0:367
3 0:0613 0:062 0:185
4 0:0153 0:017 0:070
5 0:0030 0:004 0:020
6 0:0005 0:001 0:006
7 0:0001 0:0002 0:001
8 0 0:00029 0:002
16 0 0:000028 0:0004
32 0 0:000025 0:0008
64 0 0:000019 0:0012
128 0 0:000008 0:0010
256 0 0:000031 0:0078
X
nP1(n) = 1;
X
nP2(n)  4:3
This article was processed using the L ATEX macro package with LLNCS style